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Tax Loss Carryovers in a Competitive Environment*
ANJA DE WAEGENAERE, Tilburg University
RICHARD SANSING, Tilburg University, Dartmouth College†
JACCO L. WIELHOUWER, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
ABSTRACT
The fact that incumbent firms can immediately deduct research and development (R&D) invest-
ments from taxable income is generally believed to give them a strategic advantage over new
firms that cannot deduct the investment cost, but instead generate a net operating tax loss carry-
over. Using an analytical model, we show that this conventional wisdom need not hold in a
competitive environment. We examine operating and investment decisions in a duopolistic
industry in which an initial investment in R&D yields an immediate tax benefit for one firm, but
creates a net operating loss carryover for the other firm. If both firms invest in R&D, the firm
with the net operating loss carryover makes more aggressive capital investment decisions fol-
lowing successful R&D. This may deter the incumbent firm from investing in R&D despite the
lower aftertax costs of this investment. Changing the tax loss carryover rules would thus not
only affects start-up or loss firms, but would also affect the investment decisions of profitable
firms in the same industry.
Keywords: net operating loss carryovers, R&D investments, capital expenditures
Reports de pertes fiscales dans un environnement concurrentiel
RÉSUMÉ
Le fait que les sociétés établies puissent déduire immédiatement de leur revenu imposable leurs
investissements dans la recherche et le développement (R‑D) leur confère, estime-t-on gén-
éralement, un avantage stratégique par rapport aux nouvelles sociétés qui ne peuvent déduire le coût
de l’investissement mais obtiennent plutôt un report de perte fiscale nette d’exploitation. À l’aide
d’un modèle analytique, les auteurs montrent que cette idée reçue ne tient pas nécessairement dans
un environnement concurrentiel. Ils étudient les décisions d’exploitation et d’investissement en sit-
uation de duopole dans un secteur d’activité où un investissement initial en R‑D produit un avantage
fiscal immédiat pour une société, mais crée un report de perte nette d’exploitation pour l’autre
société. Si les deux sociétés investissent en R‑D, la société qui affiche le report de perte nette
d’exploitation prend des décisions plus audacieuses en ce qui a trait aux dépenses d’investissement
lorsque les activités de R‑D sont fructueuses. Cette situation risque de dissuader la société établie
d’investir dans les activités de R‑D malgré le coût après impôt plus faible de cet investissement. La
modification des règles relatives au report des pertes fiscales aurait donc une incidence non
seulement sur les sociétés en démarrage ou les sociétés affichant des pertes, mais également sur les
décisions d’investissement des sociétés rentables appartenant au même secteur d’activité.
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1. Introduction
We study the effect of a net operating loss (NOL) carryover on operating and investment deci-
sions in a competitive setting. NOL carryovers exist because of an asymmetry in the tax law in
which gains are immediately taxed when they are realized, but losses do not necessarily provide
immediate tax refunds. Auerbach (1986) and Auerbach and Poterba (1987) identify two effects of
this asymmetry in the tax law. First, a firm that is able to get an immediate tax benefit from a tax-
deductible investment has a stronger incentive to make that investment than does a firm for which
the investment generates an NOL carryover. Second, a firm with an NOL carryover can only
make use of this NOL carryover if it generates taxable income. Therefore, once a firm has an
NOL carryover it has a stronger incentive to make an investment that generates taxable income
than does a firm without an NOL carryover. This in turn would enable a firm with an NOL carry-
over to generate more aftertax profits from an investment opportunity than a firm without an
NOL carryover.
The existing literature considers these issues by examining the investment decisions of a single
firm. In contrast, in this study we examine how two firms competing in the same industry make
research and development (R&D) and capital investment decisions when they are in different tax
positions. One firm gets an immediate tax benefit from a tax-deductible R&D investment, the other
creates an NOL carryover from its tax-deductible R&D investment. The conventional wisdom sug-
gests that the firm receiving the immediate tax benefit is more likely to make the R&D investment
than the firm that only creates an NOL carryover (Scholes et al. 2015). In contrast to what conven-
tional wisdom suggests, we find that the strategic interaction between the two firms creates situa-
tions in which the firm receiving the immediate tax benefit is less likely to invest in R&D.
We study an industry that comprises two firms: an incumbent firm (the old firm) and a start-
up firm (the new firm). The firms differ only in that the old firm is an existing firm that is profit-
able in a different business, whereas the new firm is in no other business. We consider a project
that requires investment at two stages. In the first stage, each firm has the opportunity to make an
investment in R&D. The old firm can deduct the investment from profits generated by its other
business, yielding an immediate tax benefit. The new firm cannot deduct the investment from tax-
able income on other profits, so it creates an NOL carryover that it can only use to offset taxable
income in the future. The R&D investment leads to a technological discovery at some date in the
future, which we call the discovery date. At this point, the first stage ends and the second stage
begins. At its discovery date, each firm can make a capital investment that allows it to manufac-
ture products using the discovery. If the new firm makes the capital investment, it begins using
its NOL carryover to offset the tax on profits at the start of the second stage. The tax asymmetry
provides the old firm an immediate tax deduction advantage on date zero due to its lower aftertax
investment cost of the initial R&D investment. However, it also provides the new firm an advan-
tage on its discovery date because the capital investment allows the new firm to start using its
NOL carryover, which implies that there are capital investments that have negative net present
value (NPV) for the old firm but positive NPV for the new firm. We refer to this advantage as the
new firm’s net operating loss advantage. The greater willingness of the new firm to make capital
investments can deter the old firm from making the initial tax-deductible R&D investment in the
first place. On the other hand, the ability of the old firm to obtain an immediate tax benefit rather
than to defer the tax benefit via an NOL carryover can make the initial investment more attractive
to that firm. The net effect of these two considerations on the incentive to make the initial invest-
ment is ambiguous.
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Our study has policy implications regarding the tax rules relating to net operating losses, such as
making the tax loss carryforward period unlimited as was done under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA) in the United States. Most policy discussions involving net operating losses focus on the
effects of tax losses on start-up firms. We find that these rules also affect the investment decisions of
profitable firms operating in the same industry as loss firms. In particular, we find that the NOL car-
ryover of a start-up firm can deter a profitable rival from making an investment. More generally, the
apparent disadvantage from deferring the use of a tax benefit associated with a current expenditure
can create a net advantage via its effects on a rival firm not subject to the same restriction.
The first stage of our model—the initial R&D investment—relates to studies on how taxes affect
incentives to invest in internally developed intangible assets. Robinson and Sansing (2008) examine
both the tax advantages and financial reporting disadvantages of investments in intangible assets. De
Waegenaere et al. (2012) include both the tax deductibility of investments in internally developed
intangible assets and the ability to shift income attributable to intangible assets to low-tax foreign juris-
dictions. The tax-favored treatment of the initial investment in R&D also plays an important role in our
study. However, we focus on how the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses affects competition.
Conventional wisdom suggests that profitable firms that are able to use tax losses immediately
are more likely to invest in projects that generate tax losses early in the life of the project. Ber-
ger (1993) shows that R&D tax credits are effective in stimulating investments in R&D. Hall and
Van Reenen (2000) and Bloom et al. (2002) also show that tax incentives stimulate R&D invest-
ments. Shevlin (1987) found that start-up firms are more likely to fund R&D investments via R&D
limited partnerships, which enables the tax deductions to be used immediately as opposed to creat-
ing an NOL carryover. The usefulness of R&D limited partnerships was significantly reduced after
the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) show that an NOL
carryover can lower the incentive to invest in projects with rapid depreciation deductions, because a
firm with an NOL carryover does not benefit from tax losses in the early years of the project. This
certainly holds for R&D investments that are immediately expensed. Devereux et al. (1994) show
that the asymmetric treatment of losses and gains increases the cost of capital of start-up firms.
The second stage of our model—the follow-up capital investment for which the start-up firm
can use its NOL—relates to literature on the relation between capital investments and NOL carry-
overs. Once a firm has an NOL carryover, it has an additional incentive to invest in projects with
positive expected taxable income, because the NOL carryover will shelter some or all of the income
from the investment from tax. This can lead to higher capital expenditures (Cooper and Franks 1983;
Wielhouwer et al. 2000) and earlier execution of real investment options (De Waegenaere et al. 2003).
However, empirical evidence on the relation between tax loss carryforwards and investments is
inconclusive. Edgerton (2010) finds that firms that pay no taxes generally make lower investments.
In contrast, Dreßler and Overesch (2013) find that NOL carryforwards mitigate the negative effect of
tax rates on investments.
Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we characterize the equilibrium actions at each
stage. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes in section 4. We present sensitivity and robust-
ness analysis in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2. Model
We consider two firms, which we denote “old” for the incumbent and “new” for the start-up. The
firms are indexed i  {o, n}. On date zero, the firms observe an exogenous scientific advance that
allows them to develop a technology by investing J in R&D. For example, upon observing the
availability of a new biofuel, the firms could decide whether to invest in R&D to develop an engine
that is suitable for biofuels. Whether a firm invests in R&D is not observed by the competitor.
All profits are taxed at a constant statutory tax rate τ, 0 ≤ τ < 1. The firms differ in that the old
firm is an existing firm with annual profits in a different business that exceed J. The new firm is in
no other business. This difference has implications for the tax treatment of the cost J that each firm
incurs if it invests on date zero. The old firm has another profitable business that is sufficiently large
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that the R&D investment J can be fully deducted. Therefore, the aftertax cost of the investment on
date zero to that firm equals (1 − τ)J. Because the new firm has no other business, it creates an NOL
that it is able to carry forward to future periods. For simplicity, we assume that the loss can be carried
forward indefinitely into the future and used to offset all taxable income.1 Because the focus of our
study is on how the NOL carryover of one firm affects the interaction between the two firms, we
deliberately suppress any nontax differences between the two firms. Accordingly, we assume that the
pretax costs and benefits of the investments are the same for each firm.
If a firm invests J in R&D, the time to successful development of the technology is To for
the old firm and Tn for the new firm, where To and Tn are independent and identically distributed
random variables with To, Tn  Exp(θ) (see, for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980), so the
expected time to discovery is 1/θ. After a firm successfully finishes its R&D, it can produce
goods at marginal cost v per unit by making a fixed capital investment of K.2 We assume that
each firm observes when the rival starts production, which happens immediately following the
capital investment K.3 The first firm to invest K is a monopolist in the market. If the second firm
also invests K, the firms engage in Cournot duopolistic competition from that point forward. Let
the price p of the product be p = d − Q, where d is a demand parameter and Q = qo + qn is total
production by both the old and the new firm. The parameters d, v, K, J, and θ are common
knowledge. The timeline is illustrated in Figure 1.
We define an equilibrium as a production decision, a capital investment decision, an R&D
investment decision, and a belief regarding the rival’s R&D investment strategy, capital invest-
ment strategy, and production quantities such that:
Figure 1 The timeline of events
{o,n}
Notes: If only firm i  {o, n} makes the R&D investment J on date 0, then x = i and date Ty does not exist.
If both firms invest J on date zero, x  {o, n} denotes the firm that finishes R&D first and y  {o, n}, y ∈ x,
denotes the firm that finishes R&D second. If both firms invest J on date 0 and make the capital investment
K on their discovery date, firm x will be a monopolist from date Tx till date Ty; after date Ty, the firms
engage in duopolistic competition. If only one firm invests both J on date 0 and K on its discovery date, that
firm becomes a monopolist from the date it makes the discovery.
1. Countries may have limited loss carryforward periods or restrictions on the percentage of taxable income that the
loss carryover can offset. Such restrictions do not qualitatively change our results.
2. For expositional convenience, we assume that the capital investment K does not decay over time and is not
expensed or depreciated for tax purposes. Although depreciating K for tax purposes reduces the new firm’s net
operating loss advantage, it can still dominate the old firm’s immediate tax deduction advantage.
3. Including a time delay between the capital investment K and the start of production does not qualitatively change
our results.
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• On each date after the date on which the firm has invested K, its production quantity maxi-
mizes its aftertax profits, given the rival’s production quantity on that date.
• On each firm’s discovery date Ti,
• if the rival has already invested K, the firm chooses whether to invest K to maximize the
present value of its future aftertax cash flows, taking its own future production quantity
and its beliefs regarding the rival’s future production quantity as given;
• if the rival has not yet invested K, the firm chooses whether to make a capital investment
K to maximize the present value of its future aftertax cash flows, taking its own future
production quantity and its beliefs regarding the rival’s future capital investment strategy
and production quantity as given.
• On date zero, each firm chooses whether to invest J in R&D to maximize the present value
of its future aftertax cash flows, given its own capital investment strategy and future pro-
duction quantity and its beliefs regarding the rival’s R&D investment strategy, capital
investment strategy and production quantities.
• All beliefs are consistent with the firms’ R&D investment strategies, capital investment
strategies, and production quantities.
3. Equilibrium investment decisions
In this section, we investigate the effects of the new firm’s NOL on the equilibrium investment
decisions of the two firms. We first characterize the optimal production decisions and determine
the value of the aftertax profits for each firm. In two subsequent subsections, we use these results
to characterize the firms’ equilibrium decisions whether to invest K on their discovery dates, that
is, once they finish R&D, and whether to invest J in R&D on date zero.
Aftertax profits as of the discovery date
We now derive the present value of each firm’s aftertax profits as of its discovery date, which
depend on whether the rival also invests K on its discovery date, and, if so, on whether the firm
is first or second to make the discovery. We characterize a firm’s optimal production quantity in
Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
We first determine the present value of aftertax profits to firm i  {o, n} if the rival does not
invest K. If only firm i invests K, it earns pretax monopoly profits of m = (d − v)2/4 per period in
perpetuity; see Lemma 3 and its proof in the Appendix. The aftertax present value of these




1−τð Þme−rtdt = 1−τð Þm
r
, ð1Þ
where r > 0 denotes the discount rate. Whereas the old firm expenses its investment J on date
zero, the investment of J by the new firm creates an NOL that it uses after it invests K. Therefore,
in addition to P(m), the new firm earns the present value of the tax benefits from the NOL.
Because the new firm can use its NOL at rate m per period from its discovery date until it is fully
used, which occurs on date t = Tn + J/m, the present value of the tax benefits from the NOL at







= τJδ m,Jð Þ, ð2Þ
where




 0,1ð Þ: ð3Þ
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The term δ(m, J) can be interpreted as a discount factor. When pretax income m becomes arbi-
trarily large or when the discount rate r becomes arbitrarily small, δ(m, J) converges to one.
Thus the present value of tax benefits is close to τJ, the tax benefit that would be obtained if
the initial investment J was deducted immediately. In contrast, if m is very small or r is very
large, δ(m, J) converges to zero. In those cases, the present value of the tax benefits of the NOL
is small.
Next, we determine the present value of aftertax profits to firm i  {o, n} if the rival also
invests K, and firm i is first to finish R&D. Firm i then earns monopoly profits of m per period
until the rival invests K, and earns duopoly profits of c = (d − v)2/9 per period thereafter in perpe-
tuity. See Lemma 3 and its proof in the Appendix for the derivation of the duopoly profits. The
time that elapses until the rival finishes its R&D is an exponentially distributed random variable
with mean 1/θ. We show in Lemma 2 in the Appendix that if firm i  {o, n} is first to finish
R&D, the expected present value of aftertax profits, ignoring the effects of the NOL carryover,
equals:
~P m,cð Þ= r
θ + r









Because m > c, it follows from (4) that ~P m,cð Þ is decreasing in θ. This occurs because the present
value from investing K when a firm finishes its R&D first is higher when it expects to be a
monopolist for a longer time, that is, when θ is lower.
In addition to ~P m,cð Þ, the new firm earns the present value of the tax benefits from its NOL.
If it is first to finish R&D, it can use its NOL at rate m until the old firm finishes its R&D or the
NOL is fully used, whichever occurs first. If the NOL is not fully used by the time the old firm
finishes its R&D, the new firm uses its remaining NOL at rate c as of that date until it is fully
used. We show in Lemma 2 in the Appendix that the expected present value of the tax benefits
for the new firm as of its discovery date equals τJ~δ m,c,Jð Þ, where:






















 e− θ + rð ÞJm−e−rJc
 
 ½0,1: ð5Þ
The term ~δ m,c,Jð Þ can be interpreted as the expected discount factor for the new firm’s NOL
when both firms invest K and the new firm finishes its R&D first.
Finally, we determine the present value of aftertax profits to firm i  {o, n} if the rival also
invests K, and firm i is second to finish R&D. Firm i then earns duopoly profits of c per period
into perpetuity. Therefore, the aftertax present value of these profits equals P(c) for the old firm,
and equals P(c) + τJδ(c, J) for the new firm, where P(c) and δ(c, J) are given by (1) and (3) with
m replaced by c.
In Table 1, we summarize the present value of aftertax profits from investing K on the
discovery date.
We assume that the market is sufficiently lucrative that in the absence of a competitor, either
firm would invest J on date zero and K on its discovery date. We show in Lemma 4 in the
Appendix that this is satisfied if and only if:4
4. There are values of J above Jmax for which the new firm will not invest in the absence of a competitor, whereas the
old firm will invest because it gets an immediate tax benefit from investing J. We restrict our attention to projects
that both firms could consider profitable in order to study the effects of the asymmetric tax treatment on competitive
behavior.
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+ τJδ m,Jð Þ−K
 
≥ J: ð6Þ
We refer to the highest value of J that satisfies (6) as Jmax. Because Jmax depends on K,
(6) puts a joint bound on J and K.
Equilibrium capital investment decisions on the discovery date
In this section, we use Table 1 to characterize the firms’ equilibrium capital investment decisions
on their respective discovery dates, that is, when they finish R&D.
If the rival did not invest J, condition (6) ensures that the firm will invest K on its discovery
date. If both firms invest J on date zero, each firm’s equilibrium decision whether to invest K on
its discovery date depends on whether the rival also invests K, and if so, on whether the firm is
first or second to make the discovery. To characterize the equilibrium decisions, we define three
critical values of K in Table 2.5
Each firm is willing to invest K if, and only if, the investment has a non-negative NPV.
Using Table 1, the maximum that the old firm is willing to invest is Ko = P(c) when it is the sec-
ond to finish R&D. The maximum that the new firm is willing to invest is Kn = P(c) + τJδ(c, J)
when it is the second to finish R&D. Using (4), the maximum that the old firm is willing to invest
is Kf = eP m,cð Þ when it is the first to finish R&D, assuming that the new firm will invest K on its
discovery date.
To determine the optimal investment strategies, we rank the three critical values. First,
because m > c, investing is more attractive to the old firm if it is first to finish R&D than if it is
second to finish R&D, and so it holds that Ko < Kf. Second, because the new firm still has the
NOL that it can use to reduce the tax burden of the investment revenues, investing K if the rival
is already in the market is more attractive to the new firm than to the old firm, that is, Ko < Kn.
Finally, Kf can be smaller or greater than Kn. The difference between them is:
TABLE 1
Present value of aftertax profits from investing K on the discovery date, conditional on being first or second
to finish R&D and on the rival’s strategy
Present value for firm i if it invests K
Rival does not
invest K
Rival will invest K and firm i is first
to finish R&D
Rival invests K and firm i is second
to finish R&D
i = o P(m) ~P m,cð Þ P(c)
i = n P(m) + τJδ(m, J) ~P m,cð Þ + τJ~δ m,c,Jð Þ P(c) + τJδ(c, J)
Notes: P(m) (P(c)) is the after tax present value of future profits for the entire period as a monopolist
(Cournot duopolist) excluding the effects of the NOL (see (1)). ~P m,cð Þ is the after tax present value of
future profits excluding the effects of the NOL when the firm finishes R&D first and the rival will also
invest when it finishes R&D (see (4)). τJδ(m, J) (τJδ(c, J)) is the present value of future tax savings from
the NOL for the new firm when it is a monopolist (Cournot duopolist) for the entire period (see (3)).
τJ~δ m,c,Jð Þ is this present value when the new firm finishes R&D first and the old firm will also make the
capital investment K when it finishes R&D (see (5)).
5. There is a fourth critical value, Kfn = ~P m,cð Þ+ τJ~δ m,c,Jð Þ, below which the new firm will make the capital invest-
ment if (1) it finishes R&D first and (2) the old firm will invest K on its discovery date. However, the old firm will
only invest when it is second to finish R&D if K ≤K0 ≤Kfn. Therefore, this fourth critical value has no effect on the
investment behavior of the firms.
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Kf −Kn =
m−cð Þ 1−τð Þ
θ + r
−τJδ c,Jð Þ: ð7Þ
Recall that Kf is the critical value below which the old firm invests if it is first to finish R&D,
assuming that the new firm will invest K when it finishes its R&D. The first term on the right
hand side of (7) is the difference between the expected present value from investing K to the old
firm and to the new firm in the scenario in which the old firm finishes R&D first and both firms
invest K on their respective discovery dates. The second term is the present value of the new
firm’s tax benefits from the NOL in that scenario. The new firm’s tax benefit from the NOL
(τJδ(c, J)) is increasing in the tax rate τ and in the initial investment J. If both J and τ are suffi-
ciently high, the new firm’s tax benefit is so high that the value it derives from investing
K when it is second to finish R&D exceeds the value that the old firm derives from investing
K when it is first to finish research, that is, Kn > Kf. If the tax rate τ is too low, there is no value
of J for which Kn > Kf. We summarize the possible rankings of Ko, Kn, and Kf in the following
lemma.
LEMMA 1. The three critical values Ko, Kn, and Kf are ranked as follows:
Ko <Kf <Kn, if τ > τ*andJ > J*,











cτ θ + rð Þ
c θτ + rð Þ− 1−τð Þrm
 
: ð10Þ
We now use the rankings in (8) to characterize the optimal investment decisions on the firms’
discovery dates. To do so, we identify four regions of values of K, denoted as regions A–D. The
regions are defined in Table 3.
Because the new firm has the NOL that it can use to shield revenues from taxes once it starts
producing, the NPV from making the capital investment is higher for the new firm that for the
old firm. This affects the firm’s equilibrium investment decisions in regions B and C, but not in
regions A and D. In region A, K is sufficiently low that investing K has positive NPV even if the
rival has invested K and even without the NOL (because K ≤ Ko). Therefore each firm invests
TABLE 2
Critical values of K
Maximum value of K For which
Ko =
1−τð Þc
r =P cð Þ Old firm invests K if it is second to finish R&D and the new firm
has already invested K on its discovery date
Kn = P(c) + τJδ(c, J) New firm invests K if it is second to finish R&D and the old firm
has already invested K on its discovery date
Kf = rθ + r




 	 1−τð Þc
r =
eP m,cð Þ Old firm invests K if (i) it is first to finish R&D and (ii) the new
firm will invest K on its discovery date
Notes: K is the capital investment that a firm needs to make to start production once it finishes R&D. The
critical value mentioned in column 1 is the maximum value of K for which a firm wants to invest K in the
scenario mentioned in column 2.
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K even if it is second to finish R&D. In region D, K is sufficiently high that investing if the rival
has already invested K has negative NPV even with the NOL (because K > Kn), so each firm
invests only if it is first to finish R&D.
In contrast, for intermediate values of K (regions B and C), the new firm’s NOL carryover
implies that some projects that have negative NPV to the old firm have positive NPV for the new
firm. In region B, K ≤ Kf ensures that the capital investment has positive NPV for either firm if it
finishes R&D first. However, investing if the rival finishes R&D first only has positive NPV for
the new firm because K > Ko. Hence, the new firm invests even if it finishes R&D second
(because K < Kn), whereas the old firm only invests if it finishes R&D first. In region C, K ≤ Kn
ensures that the new firm will invest K on its discovery date even if the old firm has already
invested K. Anticipating this behavior, the old firm will not invest K on its discovery date because
K > Kf. Hence, in region C the new firm’s credible threat to invest if it is second to finish R&D
deters the old firm from investing even if it finishes R&D first.
We summarize the firms’ investment strategies on their respective discovery dates in each of
the four regions in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1. If both firms invest J on date zero, the optimal investment decisions on their
discovery dates are as displayed in Table 4.
The firms’ equilibrium behavior in regions B and C is consistent with the idea that a firm with an
NOL carryover will be more aggressive than a firm without an NOL carryover when making an
TABLE 3
Definitions of regions A–D
Region
A B C D
If τ > τ* and J > J*: K ≤ Ko Ko < K ≤ Kf Kf < K ≤ Kn K > Kn
Otherwise: K ≤ Ko Ko < K ≤ Kn – K > Kn
Notes: The critical values Ko, Kf, and Kn are as defined in Table 2. If the tax rate τ satisfies τ > τ
* and the
R&D investment J satisfies J > J*, it holds that Kn > Kf (see (8)), and the values of the capital investment K
between Ko and Kn are divided between regions B and C. Otherwise, it holds that Kn ≤ Kf. In this case,
region C is empty and all values of K between Ko and Kn are in region B.
TABLE 4
Decision whether to invest K on the discovery date if both firms invest J on date zero
Region Investment decision by new firm Investment decision by old firm
Region A always invest always invest
Region B always invest invest only when first
Region C always invest never invest
Region D invest only when first invest only when first
Notes: always invest means that the firm makes the capital investment K regardless of whether it is first or
second to finish R&D; invest only when first means that the firm invests K only if it finishes R&D first. The
bold entries represent cases in which the firms make different investment decisions when in similar
circumstances.
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investment that generates taxable income (e.g., Auerbach 1986; Cooper and Franks 1983;
Wielhouwer et al. 2000).
We illustrate the four regions A–D (defined in Table 3) in Figure 2. The parameter values are
τ = 30%, r = 10%, c = 120, m = 270, and θ = 1. Combinations of K and J in the upper right part
of the graph are ruled out because J > Jmax, and so investing in R&D would not be attractive to
the new firm even in the absence of competition. Because J ≤ Jmax and because the boundary Kn
is a function of J, the regions depend jointly on K and J. For all values of J, the vertical line that
represents the value of Ko separates regions A and B. The separations between regions B, C and
D depend on whether Kn < Kf or Kn ≥ Kf, which in turn depends on the values of τ and J. Because
τ > τ* ≈ 0.102, there exists a J* such that Kn ≤ Kf for J ≤ J* and Kn > Kf for J > J* (see (8)). The
dotted line represents the value of J* ≈ 370. For J ≤ J* the sloping line that represents the value
of Kn separates regions B and D and region C does not exist (see the second row in Table 3). For
J > J*, the vertical line that represents Kf separates regions B and C, and Kn separates regions C
and D (see the first row in Table 3).
Intuitively, one might expect that an increase in K makes it less likely that a firm makes the
investment. However, this is not the case for the old firm’s capital investment decision when it is
first to finish R&D and both τ > τ* and J > J*. In that case, region C is not empty (see Table 3)
and Table 4 shows that the old firm does not invest in region C but it does invest in region D,
even though K is higher in region D.
COROLLARY 1. If τ > τ* and J > J*, the old firm’s decision to invest K on its discovery date
when it is second to finish R&D is not monotonic in K: it invests if K ≤ Kf and if K > Kn,
but does not invest if K  (Kf, Kn].
Figure 2 Regions that determine the equilibrium investment decisions at the discovery dates
Notes: The regions A–D from Table 3 that determine the equilibrium investment decisions on the firms’
discovery dates, as a function of the capital investment K and the R&D investment J. The parameter values
are τ = 30%, r = 10 % , c = 120, m = 270, and θ = 1. The areas in which the new firm invests more
aggressively on its discovery date if both invest J on date zero are shaded.
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The nonmonotonicity in the old firm’s investment decision occurs because an increase in K affects
both firms’ incentives to invest. As can be seen from Table 4, when K increases from K  (Kf, Kn]
(region C) to K > Kn (region D), the new firm’s strategy changes from investing even if it is second
to finish R&D (in region C), to only investing if it is first to finish R&D (in region D). The fact that
the new firm does not invest K if it is second to finish R&D in region D makes investing
K attractive to the old firm when it is first to finish R&D.
Equilibrium R&D investment decisions on date zero
In this section we use the firms’ equilibrium capital investment strategies on their respective dis-
covery dates, as characterized in Proposition 1, to determine their equilibrium R&D investment
decisions on date zero.
We first consider region C. Table 4 shows that in this region, the new firm’s aggressive
investment strategy on its discovery date deters the old firm from investing K even if it makes the
discovery first. This in turn implies that if the new firm invests J on date zero, the old firm should
not invest J on date zero as it will never make the capital investment K. Hence, only the new firm
invests J on date zero in region C.
In contrast, in regions A, B, and D in Figure 3, each firm will invest K if it finishes R&D first
(see Table 4). Therefore, for each firm there exists a critical value of J below which the firm is
willing to invest J even if the rival does so too (see Lemma 6 in the Appendix). Let Jo be the
maximum value of J for which the old firm wants to invest J on date zero if the rival also invests
on date zero, and let Jn be this maximum value for the new firm. If J exceeds both Jo and Jn
(J high), both firms only want to invest if the rival does not. If J is lower than both Jo and Jn
Figure 3 Regions that determine the equilibrium investment decisions on date zero
Notes: The regions A–D from Proposition 2 that determine the equilibrium investment decisions on date zero,
as a function of the capital investment K and the R&D investment J. The parameter values are τ = 30%,
r = 10%, c = 120, m = 270, and θ = 1. The areas where tax asymmetry leads to asymmetric investment
behavior are shaded. In the dark shaded regions (A2 and D2) the old firm’s immediate tax deduction advantage
deters the new firm from investing J on date zero. In the light shaded regions, the new firm’s net operating
loss advantage deters the old firm from investing J on date zero (in regions B2 and C), or implies that the new
firm invests more aggressively on its discovery date when they both invest J (in region B1).
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(J low), both firms will invest on date zero. For values between these critical values (J intermediate),
one firm is willing to invest if its rival also invests, whereas the other firm only wants to invest if the
rival does not. As a result, the firm that is always willing to invest does so, thereby deterring its rival
from investing J on date zero. We summarize the general pattern of the investment decisions in
regions A, B, and D in Table 5.
The critical values Jo and Jn that determine the equilibrium behavior in regions A, B, and D
differ across the three regions because the firms use different capital investment strategies on their
respective discovery dates in each region (see Proposition 1), which affects the NPV of investing
J. Therefore, henceforth we denote the critical values in region k  {A, B, D} by Jko and J
k
n.
Table 5 shows that for intermediate values of J in regions A, B and D, two cases are possi-
ble: only the old firm invests if Jko > J
k




n . Hence, to fully char-
acterize the equilibrium investment decisions of the two firms in regions A, B, and D, we need to
rank the critical values Jko and J
k





occurs because: (i) the two firms have the same investment strategies on their respective discov-
ery dates (see Table 4); and (ii) the present value of the tax deductions is higher for a firm that
can deduct the loss immediately. Combined this implies that the aftertax value from investing
J on date zero is higher for the old firm than for the new firm, so Jkn ≤ J
k
o for k {A, D}. Hence,
only the old firm invests for intermediate J in regions A and D. In contrast, in region B the new
firm always invests K on its discovery date whereas the old firm only invests K if it finishes R&D
first (see Table 4). If the old firm’s benefit from immediately deducting the investment J on date
zero dominates the benefit to the new firm of its more aggressive investment strategy on its dis-
covery date, the present value from investing J is higher for the old firm than for the new firm.
Thus, as was the case in regions A and D, JBo > J
B
n and so only the old firm invests for intermedi-
ate J. However, if the new firm’s benefit from its more aggressive investment strategy dominates
the old firm’s immediate tax deduction advantage, then JBn > J
B
o and only the new firm invests for
intermediate J. We present the condition for JBn > J
B
o in Lemma 7 in the Appendix.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium investment decisions on date zero in
each of the four regions A–D.
PROPOSITION 2. The firms’ equilibrium investment decisions on date zero are as follows:
(i) In regions k  {A, D}, there exist critical values Jkn ≤ J
k
o such that
if J ≤ Jkn, both firms invest J;
if Jkn < J ≤ J
k
o, only the old firm invests J;
TABLE 5
J conditions and optimal strategies in regions A, B, and D
J values Strategy
J high Jn, Jo < J < Jmax Each firm only invests if rival does not
J intermediate Jo < J ≤ Jn Only new firm invests
or Jn < J ≤ Jo Only old firm invests
J low J ≤ Jn, Jo Both firms invest
Notes: This table presents the optimal investment strategies (column 3) dependent on the level of the R&D
investment J. The regions where J is high, intermediate, or low are defined by the ranking of the critical
values Jo, Jn, and Jmax. Jo (Jn) is the maximum value of J for which the old (new) firm wants to invest J
when the rival also invests J. Jmax is the maximum value of J for which each firm would invest J in the
absence of competition.
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if Jko < J ≤ Jmax, there are two pure strategy equilibria; one in which only the old firm
invests J and one in which only the new firm invests J.
(ii) In region B, there exist critical values JBn and J
B
o and two cases are possible:
If JBn ≤ J
B
o the equilibrium decisions are as in (i) with k = B.
If JBn > J
B
o , the equilibrium investment decisions on date zero are as follows:
if J ≤ JBo , both firms invest J;
if JBo < J ≤ J
B
n , only the new firm invests J;
if JBn < J ≤ Jmax, there are two pure strategy equilibria; one in which only the old
firm invests J and one in which only the new firm invests J.
(iii) In region C, only the new firm invests J.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a firm that can obtain an immediate tax benefit from an
investment will invest more aggressively than a firm whose tax benefit would be deferred. Propo-
sition 2 shows that this conventional wisdom does not hold in region C and for intermediate J in
region B when JBo < J
B
n . In these two regions, the new firm’s more aggressive investment strategy
on its discovery date deters the old firm from investing J on date zero.
The different regions in Proposition 2 are illustrated in Figure 3, for the parameter values
from Figure 2, that is, τ = 30%, r = 10%, c = 120, m = 270, and θ = 1.
Figure 3 displays the critical values Ko, Kf, and Kn that determine the boundaries of
regions A, B, C, and D. Combinations of K and J in the upper right part of the graph are ruled
out because J > Jmax. In regions k  {A, B, D}, the downward sloping solid line represents the
critical value Jko below which the old firm invests J on date zero if the new firm also invests J.
The downward sloping dashed line represents the critical value Jkn below which the new firm
invests J on date zero if the old firm also invests J. The subregions for low, intermediate, and
high J are indicated with subindices 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The areas in between the dashed
and the solid downward sloping lines are the intermediate values of J. In the case illustrated in
Figure 3, it holds that JBo < J
B
n , so that the new firm keeps the old firm out of the market in region
B2. If instead we let θ = 0.01 and keep all other parameters the same, it holds that JBn < J
B
o . In this
case the old firm keeps the new firm out of the market in region B2.
4. Equilibrium outcomes
In this section we combine the firms’ decisions whether to invest J on date zero (from Proposi-
tion 2) and their decisions to invest K on their respective discovery dates (from Proposition 1) to
derive the possible equilibrium outcomes. We focus our discussion on how the asymmetric tax
treatment of the initial investment J affects the equilibrium outcome. We distinguish between
cases where the effect is in line with the conventional wisdom that suggests that the firm with the
immediate tax deduction advantage on date zero (the old firm) has a strategic advantage, and
cases where the conventional wisdom does not hold.
Because we have deliberately suppressed nontax differences between the two firms, equilib-
rium outcomes are symmetric when the tax rate is zero. Indeed, when τ = 0 it follows from Prop-
osition 1 and Proposition 2 that the firms would follow the same investment strategies on date
zero and the same investment strategies on their respective discovery dates, so neither firm would
have a strategic advantage over the other.6 Whenever τ > 0, however, the different tax treatment
of the initial investment cost J implies that the present value from an investment is different for
6. If τ = 0, it follows from Tables 2 and 3 that regions B and C are empty. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 5 in the
Appendix that in regions k  {A, D}, it holds that Vkn = V
k




n . Combined with Propositions 1
and 2, this implies that the two firms have the same investment strategies. Hence, they are in strategically symmet-
ric positions.
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the two firms. This in turn implies that the firms may make different investment decisions and
asymmetric equilibrium outcomes can arise.
We define the following equilibrium outcomes for firm i  {o, n} as follows:
• Uncontested Monopolist (UM(i)): only firm i invests J on date zero and thus becomes a
monopolist on the date it makes the discovery.
• Contested Monopolist (CM(i)): both firms invest J on date zero but only firm i invests K,
and so firm i becomes a monopolist on the date it makes the discovery.
• Contested Duopolist (CD): both firms invest J on date zero and invest K on their discovery
dates, and so eventually the firms engage in duopolistic competition when both have fin-
ished R&D.
We first consider the cases where both firms invest J on date zero. This occurs for J low in
regions A, B, and D. As in Figure 3, we label these regions A1, B1, and D1 in Table 6. The equi-
librium outcomes follow immediately from the firm’s capital investment decisions as summarized
in Table 4. If K is sufficiently low (region A1), both firms invest on their respective discovery
dates yielding a Contested Duopoly. If K is sufficiently high (region D1), only the first firm to dis-
cover invests K, and so each firm has a 50% chance of becoming a Contested Monopolist. How-
ever, if both firms invest J in region B, but K takes intermediate values (region B1), the new firm
invests K even if it finishes R&D second, whereas the old firm only invests K if it finishes R&D
first. Therefore, if the new firm discovers first it becomes a Contested Monopolist whereas if the
old firm discovers first the two firms become Contested Duopolists. We summarize the equilib-
rium outcomes when both firms invest J in Table 6. The case in which the new firm becomes a
Contested Monopolist is highlighted in bold.
Next, we consider the cases in which there is a unique equilibrium in which one firm invests
J on date zero and the other firm does not, resulting in one of the firms being an Uncontested
Monopolist. This occurs in region C as well as for intermediate values of J in regions A, B, and
D. As in Figure 3, we label these regions A2, B2, and D2 in Table 7. We summarize the equilib-
rium outcomes in Table 7, highlighting the results that are contrary to the conventional wisdom
in bold.
When K is either low or high (regions A2 and D2), the conventional wisdom holds because
the two firms have the same investment strategies on their respective discovery dates and the old
firm’s immediate tax deduction advantage makes the investment of J more attractive to the old
firm than to the new firm. For intermediate values of K (regions B2 and C), the conventional
TABLE 6
Equilibrium outcomes when both firms invest J in R&D (regions A1, B1, and D1)
Region Capital investment K Equilibrium Asymmetry effect
A1 Both firms invest K CD No asymmetry
B1 Old finishes first: both invest K CD No asymmetry
New finishes first: only new
invests K
CM(n) Lack of a loss carryover leads to less
aggressive investment by the old firm
D1 Only first to finish invests K CM(o) or
CM(n)
No asymmetry
Notes: CD means Contested Duopoly; CM(i) means Contested Monopoly in which firm i  {o, n} finishes
R&D first and becomes a monopolist as of that date. In regions B and D, each of the two possible
equilibrium outcomes in the third column occurs with probability 50%. The entry in bold is an equilibrium
outcome where the lack of an NOL for the old firm implies that it invests less aggressively than the
new firm.
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wisdom holds in region B2 when JBo ≥ J
B





the conventional wisdom does not hold because the new firm’s more aggressive investment
behavior on its discovery date deters the old firm from investing on date zero.
Finally, when J is high in regions A, B, and D (regions A3, B3, and D3 in Figure 3),
there are two pure strategy equilibria in which one firm invests J on date zero and the other
does not, and so one of the firms becomes an Uncontested Monopolist. The difference in the
tax treatment of the initial investment J does not cause a difference in investment behavior
in these regions because J is so high that neither firm is willing to invest J if the rival
invests J.
5. Sensitivity and robustness analysis
Sensitivity with respect to the tax rate and expected length of the R&D stage
In this section we illustrate the effects of two important parameters, the tax rate (τ) and the
expected length of the R&D process (1/θ), on the regions in which, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, the new firm becomes an Uncontested Monopolist. We show that changes
in these parameters have ambiguous effects on the likelihood that this equilibrium outcome
occurs.
Recall that the new firm’s NOL advantage implies that it becomes an Uncontested Monopo-
list in region C and in region B2 if JBn > J
B
o . Figure 4 shows regions B2 and C for three values of
the tax rate and Figure 5 shows these two regions for three values of θ. All other parameter values
are as in Figures 2 and 3. In each case, it holds that JBn > J
B
o so that the new firm becomes an
Uncontested Monopolist both in region B2 and in region C.
In Figure 4, a change in τ implies that some (K, J) values will enter B2 or C and some (K, J)
values will drop out of these two regions in response to the change. In Figure 5, the set of (K, J)
values in the combined regions B2 and C expands when θ increases. However, if we take the
same parameters as in Figure 5 and we let θ increase from 0.04 to 0.06, then JBo increases and as
a result some (K, J) values drop out of region B2. Hence, whether a change in the tax rate or in
the expected length of the R&D stage makes it more or less likely for the new firm to become an
Uncontested Monopolist is ambiguous and depends on the probability distribution of (K, J)
values.
TABLE 7
Asymmetric equilibrium outcomes in regions A2, B2, C, and D2
Region R&D investment Equilibrium Asymmetry effect
A2 Only the old firm invests UM(o) Conventional wisdom: immediate tax deduction
gives competitive advantage to the old firm
B2 If JBo > J
B
n : Only old invests UM(o) Conventional wisdom
If JBo < J
B
n : Only new invests UM(n) Loss carryover leads to more aggressive
capital investment by the new firm,
deterring R&D investment by the old firm
C Only new invests UM(n) Loss carryover leads to more aggressive
capital investment by the new firm,
deterring R&D investment by the old firm
D2 Only the old firm invests UM(o) Conventional wisdom
Notes: UM(i) means Uncontested Monopoly in which firm i  {o, n} has the competitive advantage and
only firm i makes the R&D investment J on date zero. The entries in bold are equilibrium outcomes where
the new firm’s NOL implies that it invests more aggressively than the old firm. JBo (J
B
n ) is the maximum
value of J for which the old (new) firm wants to invest J when the rival also invests J.
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Robustness to model assumptions
In this section we discuss two model assumptions. First, in our main model we assume no limita-
tions on the use of the tax loss carryforward. In some jurisdictions the NOL can only be carried
forward for a limited period of time or used to offset part of the taxable income (e.g., a maximum
of 80 percent under US tax law following the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017).
These limitations lower the value of the NOL carryover and therefore reduce the advantage of the
new firm when it makes the follow-up capital investment. Therefore, the regions in which the
new firm’s aggressive investment behavior on its discovery date deters the old firm from
investing J on date zero would tend to shrink.
Second, in our model there is a time lag between when the first and the second firm make
the discovery. This occurs because the discovery times are independent and exponentially distrib-
uted with parameter θ. Consider instead the case where at the time the first firm discovers the
technology, the information completely spills over to the second firm (see Reinganum 1985). In
that case, both firms need to decide whether they want to invest K at the time the first firm makes
the discovery. The value of investing K if the rival does so too would be Ko for the old firm and
Kn for the new firm, with Ko < Kn. Therefore, the new firm would deter the old firm from
investing K for all Ko < K ≤ Kn, which in turn would deter the old firm from investing J on date
Figure 4 Sensitivity with respect to the tax rate
Notes: Regions B2 and C (shaded areas) as a function of the capital investment K and the R&D investment J
for r = 10%, c = 120, m = 270, and θ = 1, and three values of the tax rate τ. In regions B2 and C, only the
new firm makes the R&D investment J.
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zero. Hence, all region B would then become part of region C. This occurs because in the com-
bined regions B and C, the new firm is willing to invest K if the old firm does so too, but the old
firm is not willing to invest K if the new firm does so too. So in case of information spillover on
the date the first firm makes the discovery, the region in which the new firm’s tax advantage
deters the old firm from investing K in R&D increases.7
6. Conclusion
To the extent that start-up firms cannot get an immediate tax benefit from R&D expenditures,
they are thought to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to profitable older firms. We find that
this conventional wisdom need not hold in our two-stage investment setting.
A start-up firm’s loss carryover affects competition with a firm without a loss carryover.
The firm without the loss carryover is less likely to make a capital investment at the end of its
Figure 5 Sensitivity with respect to the expected length of the R&D stage
Notes: Regions B2 and C (shaded areas) as a function of the capital investment K and the R&D investment J
for τ = 30%, r = 10%, c = 120, m = 270, and three values of the expected speed of discovery θ. In regions
B2 and C, only the new firm makes the R&D investment J.
7. The same occurs when we let θ go to infinity. However, when θ goes to infinity, two things happen simultaneously:
almost immediate discovery on date zero by both firms (but not at the same time); and almost no time lag between
the first and second to discover.
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R&D stage than is the start-up firm, because the start-up firm can only obtain the tax benefits
from its NOL carryover by making the capital investment. In contrast, the older firm received
the full tax benefit from its R&D investment when it was made. This implies that the start-up
firm invests more aggressively when it finishes its R&D, which in turn may deter the older firm from
making an initial investment in R&D. Therefore, even though the aftertax cost of an initial R&D
investment is higher for the start-up firm than it is for an older profitable firm, there are settings in
which a start-up firm would make an initial R&D investment that the older firm would reject.
Our results indicate that there are situations in which being able to deduct R&D immediately
is not a competitive advantage. The advantage of the start-up firm when making the capital
investment may partly explain the inconclusive evidence regarding the relation between tax loss
carryforwards and corporate investment (Edgerton 2010; Dreßler and Overesch 2013). This in
turn suggests that it is important to control for the competitive environment when analyzing the
effects of tax asymmetries on investment behavior.
The competitive effects should also be considered in policy decisions regarding the asymmetric
treatment of losses. Making the tax loss carryforward period unlimited, as was done under the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in the United States, makes tax-deductible investments more attractive.
Annual limitations on the use of net operating loss carryovers, as also done under the TCJA, does
the opposite. Our analysis shows that policy decisions that increase or decrease the attractiveness of
investments for loss-making firms may have the opposite effect on profitable firms.
We have deliberately suppressed any nontax differences between the two firms so as to focus
on the effects of the NOL carryover on firm investment and operating decisions. To the extent
that start-up firms and established firms have different pretax costs and benefits, our predicted dif-




In Lemma 2 we derive expressions for the present value of aftertax profit to firm i from investing
K on the date R&D finishes, when both firms invest K on the date they finish R&D and firm i is
first to finish R&D. We derive these values as a function of the pretax profit that firm i will earn
when it is a monopolist, which we denote x, and the pretax profit that it will earn when the two
firms compete, which we denote y. In the proof of Lemma 3 we will use these expressions to
determine the firms’ optimal production decisions and the corresponding optimal pretax profits
x and y.
LEMMA 2. Let the pretax profit per period in case of monopoly be x, and let the pretax profit
per period in case of duopoly be y. Then, the expected present value of aftertax profits
to the old firm from investing K on the date R&D finishes if it is first to finish R&D, and
the new firm will invest too, equals
~P x,yð Þ= r
θ + r









The expected present value of aftertax profits to the new firm from investing K on the
date R&D finishes if it is first to finish R&D, and the old firm will invest too, equals
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~P x,yð Þ + τJ~δ x,y,Jð Þ,
where





















 e− θ + rð ÞJx−e−rJy
 
 ½0,1: ð12Þ
PROOF. First consider the case where the old firm finishes first, that is, i = o. Let T be the
remaining time until the new firm invests K. The present value of aftertax profits for the old firm














The remaining time T is an exponentially distributed random variable with a density function
of fT(t) = θe
−θt. Therefore, the expected payoff as of the date the old firm finishes its R&D, when
it finishes first, is























Now, we consider the the present value of the tax benefits for the new firm if it finishes its R&D
first. We let T be the remaining time until the old firm invests K, and we let d(x, y, J, T) be the
present value on date Tn of the tax benefits of the new firm if pretax profit equals x until the old
from enters and y thereafter. The present value depends on whether the NOL is fully used up by
the time the old firm invests K, which depends on T. If T < J/x, the NOL is used at rate x until
date Tn + T. The remaining NOL of J − xT on date Tn + T is used at rate y until it is fully used.
Hence, it follows from (3) with m = x and L = J − xT that
d x,y,J,Tð Þ =
ðT
0










If T ≥ J/x, the NOL is used at rate x as of date Tn until it is fully used, and, hence,
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The remaining time T until the old firm invests K is an exponentially distributed random vari-
able with a density function of fT(t) = θe
−θt. Therefore, the expected payoff as of the date the first
firm finishes its R&D, when it finishes first, is





















Solving the integral and dividing by τJ yields (12). ▪
LEMMA 3. The new firm’s NOL does not affect the optimal production quantities of either
firm. For both firms, equilibrium pretax profit per period equals c = (d − v)2/9 when the
two firms are duopolists, and equals m = (d − v)2/4 when the firm is a monopolist.
PROOF. We first consider production decisions as of the date the firm invests K if the rival
firm does not invest. If only firm i invests, it chooses a production quantity qi so as to maximize
P x qið Þð Þ, if i = o, ð16Þ
P x qið Þð Þ+ τJδ x qið Þ,Jð Þ, if i= n ð17Þ
where
P xð Þ= 1−τð Þx
r
, ð18Þ









P x qið Þð Þ=
∂
∂x
P xð Þ ∂
∂qi
x qið Þ ð20Þ
∂
∂qi
Pðx qið Þ + τJδðx qið Þ,JÞf g =
∂
∂x
P xð Þ + τJδ x,Jð Þf g ∂
∂qi
x qið Þ: ð21Þ
It follows from (18) that ∂∂xP xð Þ> 0 for all x. Moreover, it follows from (19) that
∂
∂x τJδ x,Jð Þf g = τr 1− 1 + a=xð Þe− a=xð Þ
 	
with a = rJ. Using the Taylor expansion e a=xð Þ =P∞
n = 0 a=xð Þn > 1 + a=x yields ∂∂x τJδ x,Jð Þf g > 0 for all x. Because ∂∂xP xð Þ> 0 and ∂∂xτJδ x,Jð Þ > 0, it
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follows from (20) and (21) that the optimal production quantity satisfies ∂∂qi x qið Þ= 0, that is, it is
the quantity that maximizes pretax profit x(qi). Therefore, q*i = argmaxqx qið Þ = d−v2 and x q*i
 	
=m.
We now determine the optimal production quantities of the two firms as of the date the
second firm finishes its R&D, if they both invest K. Then, aftertax profit is given by (16) and
(17) with x(qi) replaced by x(qi| qj) = (p − v)qi = (d − qi − qj − v)qi, the pretax profit of firm i if
it produces qi units and the rival produces qj units. Because ∂∂xP xð Þ> 0 and ∂∂xτJδ x,Jð Þ> 0, it fol-
lows from (20) and (21) that the optimal production quantities satisfy q*i = argmaxqix qijq*j
 
, for









Still to be determined is the optimal production quantity qi of the first firm to finish R&D as of
the date it finishes its R&D until the second firm finishes its R&D. Whichever firm invests first, it
earns pretax profit of c as of the date the second firm invests. Therefore, if firm i finishes its R&D
first, production quantity qi for the time until the second firm enters is chosen so as to maximize
~P x qið Þ,cð Þ, if i= o,
~P x qið Þ,cð Þ+ τJ~δ x qið Þ,c,Jð Þ, if i= n,
where x(qi) is pretax profit of firm i until the second firm enters, as a function of production
quantity qi, and the functions ~P ,cð Þ and ~δ ,c,Jð Þ are as defined in (11) and (12), respectively,
with y= x q*i jq*j
 
= c. It follows from (11) that ~P x,cð Þ is increasing in x. To show that τJ~δ x,c,Jð Þ
is increasing in x, recall that τJ~δ x,c,Jð Þ=E d x,c,J,Tð Þ½ , where T is the time that elapses until the
old firm enters, and d(x, c, J, T) is given by (14) for x ≤ J/T and by (15) for x > J/T. For all values
of T, it holds that ∂d(x, c, J, T)/∂x > 0. This in turn implies that τJ~δ x,c,Jð Þ is increasing in pretax
profit x earned until the second firm enters. Because ∂∂x~P x,cð Þ > 0 and ∂∂xτJ~δ x,c,Jð Þ > 0, the optimal
production quantity satisfies ∂∂qi x qið Þ = 0. Therefore, q
*
i = argmaxqx qið Þ= d−v2 and x q*i
 	
=m. ▪
LEMMA 4. Let Jmax be the maximum value of J for which (6) is satisfied. Then
(i) In the absence of a competitor, the new firm invests J on date zero if and only if
J ≤ Jmax. The old firm invests J on date zero if J ≤ Jmax.
(ii) In the absence of a competitor, each firm invests K on its discovery date if J ≤ Jmax.
PROOF. (i) We first consider the decision to invest J on date zero. Let Mi, i  {o, n} denote
the expected present value to firm i when only firm i invests J on date zero. If only firm i  {o,
n} invests J on date zero, that firm invests K and becomes a monopolist on date Ti when its R&D
stage ends. Using Table 1 yields that the date-zero present value of investing J if the rival firm
does not invest J is e−rTi P mð Þ−Kð Þ− 1−τð ÞJ for the old firm, and e−rTi P mð Þ + τJδ m,Jð Þ−Kð Þ









P mð Þ−K½ − 1−τð ÞJ, ð22Þ
and
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P mð Þ + τJδ m,Jð Þ−K½ −J: ð23Þ
Condition (6) is satisfied if Mn ≥ 0. Because Mn is decreasing in J, Jmax is the value of J at which
Mn = 0 and Mn ≥ 0 if and only if J ≤ Jmax. Hence, in the absence of a competitor, the new firm
invests J on date zero if and only if J ≤ Jmax. Because Mo is also decreasing in J and Mo ≥ Mn, it
holds that Mo ≥ 0 if J ≤ Jmax. Hence, in the absence of a competitor the old firm invests J on date
zero if J ≤ Jmax.
(ii) We now show that if 0 ≤ J ≤ Jmax, each firm invests K on its discovery date in the
absence of a competitor. In the absence of a competitor, the net present value on discovery date
from investing K is P(m) − K for the old firm and P(m) + τJδ(m, J) − K for the new firm. We
have shown that J ≤ Jmax implies Mo ≥ 0. Therefore, when 0 ≤ J ≤ Jmax it follows from (22) that
P(m) − K ≥ 0, and hence also P(m) + τJδ(m, J) − K ≥ 0. ▪
Proof of Lemma 1
First, m > c implies that Ko < Kf. Next, Kn > Ko follows from the fact that (see (2) with
m replaced by c)





Finally, to rank Kn and Kf, note that Kn > Kf iff h(J) < 0, where the function h : R !R is
given by
h Jð Þ≔ m−cð Þ 1−τð Þ
θ + r
−τJδ c,Jð Þ:
It follows from (24) that h is continuous and decreasing in J, with h(0) > 0, and
lim
J!∞















Hence, two cases are possible:
• If τ ≤ r(m − c)/(rm + θc), then limJ ! ∞h(J) ≥ 0. Because h is decreasing in J, this implies
that h(J) ≥ 0 for all J.
• If τ > r(m − c)/(rm + θc), then limJ ! ∞h(J) < 0. Because h is decreasing in J and h(0) > 0,
there exists a J* > 0 such that h(J*) = 0 , h(J) > 0 for J < J*, and h(J) < 0 for J > J*.
Together, this implies that h(J) < 0 iff τ > τ* and J > J*, and so we conclude that
K f <Kn, if τ >
r m−cð Þ
rm+ θc
and J > J*,
Kn ≤K f , otherwise: ð25Þ
Solving h(J*) = 0 yields the value of J* in (10). ▪
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Proof of Proposition 2
We have shown in Lemma 4 that for both firms, investing J on date zero if the rival does not
invest is optimal because J ≤ Jmax. Now let Vki , i {o, n} be the payoff to firm i when both firms
invest J on date zero. Investing, if the rival firm does too, is optimal for firm i {o, n} if and only

















Πko,2− 1−τð ÞJ, ð26Þ



















n,2depend on the region, as
displayed in Table 8.
PROOF. We first determine the value of each firm as of the date it finishes R&D, distinguishing the
case where the firm is first to finish R&D, and the case where it is second to finish R&D. For firm
i {o, n}, we determine
• Πki,1 : the value of firm i as of the date that it finishes R&D, conditional on being first to fin-
ish R&D.
• Πki,2 : the value of firm i as of the date that it finishes its R&D stage, conditional on being
second to finish R&D.
The values of Πki,1 and Π
k
i,2 depend on the two firms’ investment decisions on the date they
finish their R&D stages. Combining Tables 1 and 4 yields the expressions in Table 8.
TABLE 8








k = A ~P m,cð Þ−K ~P m,cð Þ−K + τJ~δ m,c,Jð Þ P(c) − K P(c) − K + τJδ(c, J)
k = B ~P m,cð Þ−K P(m) − K + τJδ(m, J) 0 P(c) − K + τJδ(c, J)
k = C 0 P(m) − K + τJδ(m, J) 0 P(m) − K + τJδ(m, J)
k = D P(m) − K P(m) − K + τJδ(m, J) 0 0
Notes: The value of firm i  {o, n} on the date it finishes R&D, conditional on being first to finish
R&D (Πki,1) and conditional on being second to finish R&D (Π
k
i,2). P(m) (P(c)) is the after tax present value
of future profits for the entire period as a monopolist (Cournot duopolist) excluding the effects of the NOL
(see (1)). ~P m,cð Þ is the after tax present value of future profits excluding the effects of the NOL when the
firm finishes R&D first and the rival will also invest when it finishes R&D (see (4)). τJδ(m, J) (τJδ(c, J)) is
the present value of future tax savings from the NOL for the new firm when it is a monopolist (Cournot
duopolist) for the entire period (see (3)). τJ~δ m,c,Jð Þ is this present value when the new firm finishes R&D
first and the old firm will also make the capital investment K when it finishes R&D (see (5)).
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Next, we discount these values back to date zero, recognizing that the date that a firm fin-
ishes its R&D stage is the realization of a random variable, the distribution of which depends on
whether it was the first or second to finish its R&D. When a firm finishes its R&D first, the date
upon which it finishes is T1 = min{Tn, To} (the first-order statistic of Tn and To), which has a den-
sity function of f1(t) = 2θe
−2θt. Moreover, because Tn and To are independent and exponentially
distributed, Πki,1 is independent of T1. Hence, the date zero expected present value of firm


















When a firm finishes its R&D second, the date upon which it finishes is T2 = max{Tn, To}
(the second-order statistic of Tn and To), which has a density function of f2(t) = 2θe
−θt(1 − e−θt).
Because Πki,2 is independent of Tn and To, the date zero present value conditional on being second




















Because each firm has a 50% probability of being first to finish R&D, and because the new



























Combined with (28) and (29), this yields the expressions in (26) and (27). ▪
LEMMA 6. In regions k  {A, B, D}, Vko and V
k
n are decreasing in J, and there exist critical
values Jkn and J
k
o such that
Vko ≥ 0 if and only if J ≤ J
k
o, ð30Þ
Vkn ≥ 0 if and only if J ≤ J
k
n: ð31Þ
PROOF. Because Vko ≥ 0 and V
k
n ≥ 0 at J = 0, and because limJ!∞V
k
o < 0 and limJ!∞V
k
n < 0,
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it is sufficient to show that Vko and V
k





are independent of J, it holds that ∂∂J V
k
o = − 1−τð Þ in each region, and so Vko is decreasing in J. ▪
To show that Vkn is decreasing in J, it is sufficient to show that [1− τΔk(J)]J is increasing in





























δ m,Jð Þ, in region k =D: ð32Þ
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
Δk(J) is the date zero expected discount factor for the speed at which the new firm can use its
NOL. For regions B, C, and D, this follows from taking the derivative of [1 − τΔk(J)]J with
respect to J, using the fact that ∂∂J τJδ x,Jð Þf g = τe−rJ=x < 1 for x {m, c}. For region A, we let




J−τΔk Jð ÞJ = ∂
∂J
 J−D J,Tn,Toð Þ½ = ∂
∂J
J−D J,Tn,Toð Þf g
 
,
and so it suffices to show that ∂∂J D J,Tn,Toð Þf g< 1 for all realizations of To and Tn. Two cases are
possible:
• To < Tn: the new firm finishes its R&D second. It uses its NOL of J at rate c as of date Tn










Taking the derivative of D(J, Tn, To) with respect to J shows that ∂∂J D J,Tn,Toð Þf g < 1
for all J.
• Tn ≤ To: the new firm finishes first. Let T = To − Tn. Then, it follows from (14) and (15) that
















e−rTn , if J >mT
D(J, Tn, To) is continuous at J = mT. Moreover, taking the derivative of D(J, Tn, To) with respect
to J shows that ∂∂J D J,Tn,Toð Þf g< 1 for all J. ▪
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To characterize the equilibrium investment decisions of the two firms, it remains to deter-







LEMMA 7. The critical values are ranked as follows:
(i) In regions k  {A, D}, it holds that Jkn ≤ J
k
o.
(ii) In region B, it holds that JBn > J
B







P mð Þ−K½ −τ 1−ΔB JBo
 	
 
JBo > 0, ð34Þ






 = 1−τð Þ: ð35Þ
PROOF. (i) In regions k {A, D}, the value from investing J if the rival does so too (Vkn and
Vko) differs only due to a different present value of tax deductions from the initial loss J. The old
firm can deduct the loss J immediately, whereas the new firm can only use it once it has made
the discovery. Using Lemma 5 yields that in regions A and D, it holds that
Vkn−V
k
o = −τ 1−Δ
k Jð Þ
 J, ð36Þ
where Δk(J) is defined in (32). Because Δk(J) < 1, it holds that Vkn−V
k
o < 0; due to the higher pre-
sent value of the aftertax cost of the investment J, investing if the rival does so too is less attrac-
tive to the new firm than to the old firm. Because Vkn and V
k
o are both decreasing in J (Lemma 6)
this implies that in regions A and D the critical value of J below which the new firm wants to
invest, if the old firm does too, is lower than the critical value of J, below which the old firm


















P mð Þ−K½ −τ 1−ΔB Jð Þ
 J, ð38Þ
with ΔB(J) as defined in (32) for region B. Lemma 6 shows that VBn is decreasing in J and V
B
o = 0




o if and only if V
B
n > 0 at J = J
B
o , or, equivalently,
VBn −V
B
o > 0 at J = J
B




o if and only if (34) is satisfied. It
remains to determine JBo , the critical value of J below which the old firm wants to invest if




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. For regions A, B, and D, using Lemma 6 yields ▪
• If J ≤minfJkn, Jkog, then Vko ≥ 0 and Vkn ≥ 0. Hence, both firms are willing to invest J in R&D
on date zero even if the rival does too, so they both invest.
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n < 0 ≤V
k
o. The old firm wants to invest if the rival does too,
but the new firm does not want to invest if the old firm invests too. Hence, only the old firm
invests.




o < J ≤ J
k
n , then V
k
o < 0 ≤V
k
n . The new firm wants to invest if the rival does
too, but the old firm does not want to invest if the new firm invests too. Hence, only the
new firm invests.
• If J >maxfJkn , Jkog , then Vko < 0 and Vkn < 0. Therefore, each firm prefers to invest J if its
rival does not invest J, but prefers not to invest if its rival does invest. Accordingly, there
are two pure strategy equilibria: one in which the old firm invests J on date zero and the
new firm does not; and one in which the new firm invests J on date zero and the old firm
does not.
Combined with the rankings in Lemma 7, this yields the equilibrium strategies in Proposi-
tion 2(i) and (ii). The equilibrium behavior in region C follows immediately from (6) and the fact
that the old firm never invests K in this region (Proposition 1). ▪
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